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ABSTRACT 
Information technology has had a significant impact on business operations and allowed the emergence of new business 
models. These IT-enabled processes and businesses however depend on secure information systems which need to be 
managed. The management of information systems security (ISS) is a highly dynamic and complex task due to constant 
change in the information technology domain. In this paper we propose the use of a meta model to aid ISS managers in 
setting up a holistic information security management system (ISMS). For this we describe how an adapted meta model of 
ISO 27001, a security standard for ISMS, can be used to aid with general phases of ISS management. We demonstrate how 
models can support ISS managers in their endeavors. The paper concludes with a pragmatic evaluation by providing an 
example of how such a meta model can be operationalized for vulnerability identification, before discussing potential future 
research. 
Keywords 
Model Driven Engineering, Information Security Management, Modeling, Meta model. 
INTRODUCTION 
From the common workplace computer to systems for order fulfillment to entire business models like online shops; our 
increased dependence on both information as a resource and information systems is beyond question. The absence of either 
causes significant disruptions in our lives. Whether it is in our personal environment or on an enterprise scale, the 
confidentiality of our information, the availability of the systems and their integrity are some of the crucial security goals that 
must be uphold in order for us to benefit from the use of information systems. 
In an enterprise setting the preservation of these security goals is the task of the information systems security (ISS) manager. 
When looking at the areas of work and responsibilities of ISS security managers, we see a constantly growing set of tasks and 
factors an ISS manager has to take into account to ensure the security of the entrusted systems. As [2] point out, software 
vulnerabilities and virus attacks are only two typical threats managers need to address along with disgruntled employees, 
social engineering attacks and industrial espionage to name a few. This evolving repertoire of threats is being complemented 
by multiple perspectives and requirements on ISS. Laws and regulations need to be upheld and business requirements met, all 
while keeping operational aspects of ISS in sight.  
This multi-dimensionality of ISS [21] is a major cause for the complexity in the decision-making process that managers are 
facing, along with the complexity that is inherent in any socio-technical system. As information systems evolve over time 
along with their security requirements and threat landscape, IS managers increasingly need assistance with decision-making. 
In these decisions the manager needs to consider factors like the value at risk, changing business requirements, new threats 
and compliance issues to name a few that are relevant for this process. Handling this complexity in ISS practice has been 
addressed so far mostly with checklist-like approaches and guidelines as found e.g. in ISS standards. However these 
approaches do not easily lend themselves to a continuous and comprehensive ISS management, as their scope and level of 
detail does not change over time as the information security management systems (ISMS), which were initially built upon 
these guidelines and standards, do. 
A possible remedy for the complexity and solution for the evolution and consistency of such ISMS is the use of models. So 
far semi-formal models do not play an important role in the ISS management domain and have only scarcely been used to 
support ISS management. This paper advocates a model driven approach to ISS management. We assume that such an 
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approach has various advantages. We consider ISS standards like ISO 27001 to be models as they abstract – just as models 
do – from specific solutions to broadly applicable generic solutions. A meta model representing the underlying, often implicit 
structures of models can be used to harmonize the aforementioned perspectives and views on the ISS domain. Furthermore, 
meta models are a means for better and ad hoc integration of new and important information on the subject matter; and by 
organizing this new information according to a sound structure, a model driven approach might outperform the traditional 
planning models, checklists and guidelines. In addition, the reliance on the structures defined by meta models allows for 
company specific extensions/adaption of existing models and might help in upholding consistency during such changes. 
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we discuss related work in the ISS domain, specifically the use of models, 
meta models and related methods in ISS management. In the third section we describe our proposed research methodology. 
In section 4 we present a previously constructed meta model of the ISO 27001 standard. In section 5 we conduct a pragmatic 
evaluation by showing how sub-models of the meta model can support core ISS management processes before we conclude 
in section 6 and describe future research in this field. 
RELATED WORK 
In regard to our proposed ISS management methodology several areas of research are important and will be discussed as 
related work. At first an overview of existing models and modeling approaches in ISS will be presented in order to illuminate 
differences between them and short-comings when it comes to broad ISS management support. Secondly Model Driven 
Engineering will be discussed as methodology which we loosely base our approach on. 
Modeling in IS 
Modeling and models exist in a large variety in the ISS domain; however their scope, use, level of detail and level of 
formalism varies greatly. Several modeling languages and notations have been derived from the semi-formal UML. In order 
to give the reader insight into their scope we will briefly describe three representative notations based on UML. One such 
UML derivate is SecureUML [13], which extends UML via a meta model that incorporates the role-based access control 
(RBAC [18]) approach in order to model authentication and authorization mechanisms during the development of software. 
As it focuses on a specific type of control (access controls) in the context of software development, its scope is rather limited 
and the meta model does not incorporate any concepts that‟d allow e.g. the modeling of threats or security requirements apart 
from authentication/authorization. Another UML derivate is UMLsec [11] which in a two-step approach firstly transforms 
existing UML specifications into UMLsec specification and in a second step allows for a security analysis. The UMLsec 
specification mainly incorporates dependencies and behavior, a concept which mainly describes communication between 
components and systems. This is also the scope of UMLsec, which focuses on threats in the communication of information, 
not e.g. the processing. A third semi-formal UML derivate we found was Misuse Cases [20]. This extension of UML use case 
diagrams allows for the modeling of actions an adversary/attacker might perform. The notation adds actions that threaten the 
use cases within the system boundaries as well as additional security-related use cases which mitigate those attacks. 
Along with these – mostly academic – semi-formal modeling approaches many informal models exist in ISS practice. IT 
practitioners often consolidate their experience in so-called best practice frameworks like ITIL or COBIT [7]. In ISS 
specifically models like the Generally Accepted Information Security Principles (GAISP [6]) or standards like ISO 27001 
[10] are common and widely used. These informal models usually are comprised of continuous text, bullet points and 
checklists and in the case of the two mentioned examples have a broad scope in ISS. The informal approach makes the use of 
such documents easy, however, it does not lend itself to advanced techniques such as the integration of multiple models or 
the transfer of these models into software tools, e.g. for automation, model-consistency checks or logic reasoning. 
The opposite of such informal models are formal models like ontologies. Identifying core concepts of a domain and their 
relations with each other has been the motivation and goal of many modeling approaches. Ontologies specify concepts and 
relations between them for a given domain or context [8]. Although the ISS research community has long identified the need 
for a comprehensive and common set of core concepts for the ISS domain (e.g. [4]), [3] conclude from their comparative 
analysis of 30 ISS ontologies that no such thing has been found (or agreed upon) so far. Nonetheless numerous ISS 
ontologies exist. ISS researchers have identified ontologies as a means to structure either the entire information systems 
security problem domain or specific subdomains and made contributions (e.g. [1, 10, 24]). However the high degree of 
formalization leads to an equally high degree of difficulty in creating and maintaining ontologies along with e.g. their 
axioms. A level of difficulty and inevitable time-investment that goes beyond what ISS practitioners can often afford. 
As such, currently deployed models and practiced modeling in the ISS domain each have their strengths and can potentially 
contribute to a model driven ISS management approach. In order to benefit from the collective knowledge of ISS 
practitioners we propose the use of the informal best-practice models as a knowledge base, while increasing formalization in 
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order to allow the use of advanced techniques like model integration. As a targeted formalization level we‟ve chosen a semi-
formalism as it allows a methodological approach, while still being accessible to ISS practitioners (as the heavy use of UML-
based languages and diagrams in IT practice shows). 
Model Driven Engineering 
The main idea behind Model Driven Engineering (MDE) [19] is to lift the specification during application development (or 
more broadly: information systems, as it is also used for enterprise architectures amongst other things) on a higher abstraction 
level in order to gain access to automation opportunities. During the phases of specification and development the constructed 
model of the to-be-developed information system is being transformed into increasingly lower-level models using automated 
model transformations and model interpretation mechanisms. The most prominent example of MDE would be Model Driven 
Architecture (MDA). 
In MDE terms we propose the construction of a domain-specific-model (DSM), which will incorporate concepts and relations 
of the ISS management domain. However we will not (at this stage) create our own domain-specific-language (DSL) to do 
so, but rely on the semi-formal UML as a language (just as MDA for instance does) for the aforementioned reasons. As such 
we only loosely follow the ideas behind MDE at this point. It would not be beneficial for an ISS practitioner to work with a 
model which is supposed to improve the handling of complexity, when the same model requires the practitioner to learn a 
new modeling language in order to use it. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
As the nucleus for our approach – an initial high-level model – we use the ISO 27001 meta model [16]. As mentioned before, 
by using a best-practice model as our foundation we build upon the consolidated knowledge base of ISS practitioners. The 
meta model has been developed using a rigorous approach based on grounded theory and qualitative data analysis (QDA) 
methods.  
The basic idea in grounded theory (as with most QDA methods) is to work with empirical data like transcripts from 
interviews, protocols and documents a researcher is confronted with in the field. The focus is on inductively developing a 
theory, which is „grounded‟ in the respective empirical data. One central activity is the "coding", which means 
conceptualizing qualitative data and assigning categories as well as relations between them. The events and instances a 
researcher is facing in the data are analyzed as potential “indicators of phenomena … which are thereby given conceptual 
labels” [8, p. 7]. With this approach the structure of ISO 27001 was derived by identifying relevant categories/concepts as 
well as their relations. Figure 1 depicts the proposed research methodology starting with the ISO 27001 meta model. 
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Security Ontologies
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Semi-evaluated
Metamodel
Application 
(Pragmatical 
evaluation)
Evaluated
Metamodel
Bugtraq 
Vulnerability 
Archive
Information 
Security Process 
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Figure 1. Research Methodology 
Like in information systems development (ISD) we assume, that the quality of an end-product (in our case the ISS 
management system) depends to a great extent on the quality of early models, which conceptualize the problem domain in 
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earlier stages of the development process. Therefore, prior to the model application in the context of ISS managerial 
processes, we evaluate the meta model by applying criteria from literature. We rely on the evaluation approach of [12] which 
– according to [14] – “is the only one that has both a theoretical basis and has been empirically validated”. 
[12] present a framework for evaluating conceptual models which is based on linguistic concepts, and, furthermore, 
distinguishes between goals and means. The syntactical quality describes whether the model adheres to the rules of the 
grammar. In this research we used UML class diagrams, which were checked for syntactic correctness. Usually this quality 
dimension can be controlled [14]. 
The semantic quality evaluates how well the model reflects the reality or subject matter. Important issues in this respect are, 
if the model lacks something that the domain contains or if it includes something the domain doesn‟t have. As we do not 
model the real world in our meta model, but the structures of another model, the criteria proposed by [12] and [14] – e.g. 
validity, completeness, feasible validity – cannot be applied in our work. We therefore operationalize the semantic quality 
criteria using coherence and consistency with prior literature. In a first step of our research process we compare the first 
version of our meta model with related models and ontologies that share the same domain and scope. This semantic 
evaluation has been conducted in prior work [17]. Figure 2 shows the relevant quality criteria for conceptual models, which 
should be operationalized for an evaluation. 
Security 
model(s)
Security 
Meta Model
IS Manager
UML, Class 
Diagram
Semantic
Quality
Syntatic
Quality
P
ra
gm
at
ic
 
q
u
al
it
y
Actor
Domain Model Language
 
Figure 2. Quality criteria for the evaluation of conceptual models 
(see [12; 14]) 
So far the pragmatic quality of models has only scarcely been addressed in the research of conceptual modeling in general. 
To the best of our knowledge the pragmatic evaluation of ISS model quality has not been operationalized in literature. While 
[12] reduce the notion of pragmatics to the comprehension we assume that a broader conception would be fruitful, esp. in 
regards to adoption rate by ISS practitioners. In accordance to [15] we address aspects of „pragmatics of action‟. Hence, in 
section 6 we demonstrate the applicability by using the meta model within a management process of ISS. Drawing on an 
example we can reveal how the model can solve relevant problems. 
The goal is not to evaluate whether or not the meta model is a good representation of the ISO 27001 standard, as we believe 
that the repetitive inductive categorization process used to derive the concepts of the meta model is rigorous and complete. 
Rather our goal is to determine how well the meta model (and as such the concrete ISO 27001 model) reflects the reality or 
subject matter. 
ISO 27001 META MODEL 
Based on an inductive categorization approach a meta model of the ISO 27001 ISS standard (Annex A specifically) has been 
developed. The meta model is shown in figure 3 and will be briefly discussed. See [16] for a full discussion. Additionally the 
semantic evaluation has been completed in [17] and been incorporated in the adapted ISS management meta model. 
Milicevic et al.  Model Driven Information Security Management 
Proceedings of the Seventeenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Detroit, Michigan August 4th-7th 2011 5 
Role Asset
Requirement
Threat
Control
Security
Incident
1
Control 
Objective
responsible for manifests as
m
it
ig
at
es
adjusts to
implemented by
enables
fulfills
threatens
h
as
Vulnerability Exploit
exploits
h
as
u
se
s
 
Figure 3. Adapted Information Systems Security Management Meta Model [17] 
The concept „requirements‟ is further specified by three sub concepts we identified in the standard: 1) security requirements, 
2) legal requirements and 3) business requirements. These distinctions indicate potential aspects or layers of information 
security management, as suggested by other information security researchers (see [9]). 
In comparison to the other core concepts „role‟ has relatively weak grounding based on the in-vivo coding. However, with 10 
quotations the code „responsibility‟ is one of the more predominant ones and represents the relation between „role‟ and other 
concepts, mainly „asset‟. To include this emphasis on an ownership-type paradigm we decided to include role as a 
(supporting) core concept. The relationships among the concepts have been derived by analyzing quotations. 
After adding the five core concepts (asset, threat, control, requirement and role) and branching „requirement‟ and „control‟ 
into sub concepts, we re-evaluated prior excluded codes with singular occurrences. By doing so we identified three codes that 
had a semantic similarity: „security event‟, „security incident‟ and „security breach‟. While interpretation allows to distinct 
them by varying levels of severity, we decided to perform code merging and add them as one core concept („security 
breach‟), since an analysis of quotations for the „control‟ and „threat‟ concept showed that this element played an important 
part for the control objectives A.8.2, A.10.10 and A.13.2. Additionally we added „control objective‟, as it is an important 
structural element in the standard which groups controls and elaborates on their common purpose. 
It is notable, that in the part of the ISO 27001 standard we used for our analysis, measures were not included systematically, 
even though in the rest of the standard they are mentioned frequently. Furthermore, there is no strong evidence that roles and 
responsibilities might be assigned to controls or control objectives. From a governance point of view, it would be of central 
importance to define accountability and decision rights during the implementation of a security standard, not just for assets, 
but potentially controls and even threats. 
During the semantic evaluation in [17] with other ontologies of the ISS domain twofurther concepts have been identified: 
vulnerabilities, most common as software flaws, and exploits, the specific attack vector of a threat, mostly tailored to benefit 
from a specific vulnerability. These two concepts are crucial for the day-to-day activities in ISS operations. 
PRAGMATIC EVALUATION – APPLICATION OF THE META MODEL 
For a pragmatic evaluation of the meta model, activities (as „actions‟ in [15]‟s proposed pragmatic evaluation) in information 
security management need to be identified. Most activities are linked to the three main questions information security 
managers are facing: 1) What needs to be protected? 2) Against what does it have to be protected? 3) How can it be 
protected? Answering these three fundamental questions leads to: 1) the identification of assets, 2) the identification of 
threats and 3) the identification and selection of appropriate countermeasures as main activities for ISS managers. However 
this way of ad-hoc reasoning does neither allows nor conforms with a rigorous evaluation, as such – similar to our semantic 
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evaluation – a comparison and consolidation of multiple ISS management processes would be preferable. Thankfully we can 
build upon work of other researchers in this respect. 
A Process Model of Information Security 
We base the pragmatic evaluation on activities that are found in the related ISO 27005 standard, which describes a so-called 
information security risk management (ISRM) process. [5] have analyzed said standard along with 4 other standards and 
derived generic phases of information security (risk) management, which are listed in table 2. 
 
Generic phase ISO 27005 phase Output 
System Characterization Identification of Assets 
Inventory list of assets to be protected, including 
their accepted risk level 
Threat and Vulnerability 
Assessment 
Identification of Threats, Identification of 
Vulnerabilities 
List of threats and corresponding vulnerabilities 
endangering the identified assets 
Risk Determination 
Identification of Impact, Assessment of Threat 
Likelihood, Assessment of Vulnerability 
Likelihood, Risk Estimation 
Quantitative or qualitative risk figures/levels for 
identified threats (input: threat probability and 
magnitude of impact) 
Control Identification Evaluation of Existing and Planned Controls 
List of potential controls that can mitigate the risks 
to an acceptable level 
Control Evaluation and 
Implementation 
Information Security Risk Treatment (Risk 
Avoidance, Risk Reduction, or Risk Transfer) 
List of cost-efficient controls that have to be 
implemented to reduce the risk to an acceptable 
level 
Table 1. ISRM process model (extract from [5]) 
In the left column the generic phases coined by [5] are listed with their equivalent from the ISO 27005 standard in the middle 
column. [5] also listed expected outputs for each of the phases, which can be found in the right column. Based on this process 
model and outcomes we‟ll discuss possible applications of the meta model and demonstrate how it can support information 
security managers in their tasks. Due to page restrictions we cannot include concrete models for each phase. These can be 
obtained from the authors via request. 
Mapping of Opportunities for Model-Support 
System Characterization 
In the system characterization phase the information security manager is tasked to identify and list all assets which require 
protection. What constitutes an asset is not necessarily clear. We argue that relevant assets need to be deserving of protection, 
meaning they must have a value attached to them which may be inflicted if an attack was to be successfully launched. [5] also 
add the inclusion of accepted risks levels in the asset identification process. 
Models, and in this instance our meta model, can support this phase by instantiating the asset concept and providing the 
necessary attributes to detail things like the internal identification code (e.g. from the inventory system or a configuration 
item database like used in ITIL), vendor name or version. By adding a recursive reference to the asset concept in our meta 
model certain dependencies between assets could be modeled as well, e.g. the asset “web server” could be running on an 
asset “blade server”. Were the web server to be compromised, other assets running on the same host machine would be 
exposed to threats that wouldn‟t be identified outside of this larger context. 
Threat and Vulnerability Assessment 
During the Threat and Vulnerability Assessment phase the identified assets are checked for known threats which could be 
realized via vulnerabilities within the asset. The terminology stems mainly from software security and refers to software 
vulnerabilities which can be exploited by so-called Exploits. However this setting can equally be transferred to non-software 
assets like confidential information known to management. The threat might be social engineering, where an attacker tries to 
persuade the victim to reveal information and grant him access without realizing the situation. The vulnerability in this 
scenario may be a lack of security awareness on the part of the manager who is targeted. 
The assessment of threats and vulnerabilities has a certain temporal element to it, as the threat concept to our understanding 
represents a class of potential vulnerabilities. As such threats are often found in (hierarchical) taxonomies and special threat 
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ontologies, while new vulnerabilities quite literally appear every day and as such need to be assessed in a more continuous 
way. 
The vulnerability concept is quite common in information security modeling, as our comparison with multiple ontologies 
showed. However the ISO 27001 standard did not explicitly mention it. In order to support this phase the vulnerability 
concept should be added to the meta model so it can be instantiated, just like the threat concept can be. 
Risk Determination 
The risk determination deals with qualitative or quantitative factors of risk, especially probabilities and the impact of a 
successful security breach. Typically various approaches suggest the formulation of varying degrees of risk in order to build a 
simple qualitative risk model based on e.g. three levels of probability and severity (like: “low”, “medium”, “high”). 
This is the phase where the described meta model has the least to offer in terms of support. Ultimately the determined risk 
levels can be added as attributed to various concepts, but those number cannot be analyzed or condensed without additional 
methodology that our model is not support as of right now. However it is desirable to find a solution to this as the 
quantification of information security is one of the grand challenges in this domain. The model of assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities could allow the description of propagation or sharing of risk amongst multiple assets or assets in a certain 
constellation. 
Control Identification  
Similar to the identification of assets and threats and vulnerabilities the possible controls must be identified, stored and 
analyzed in order to support information security managers in their decision making process. 
Models in general and our meta model in this instance can help by instantiating the control concept as well as putting various 
controls in relation to each other using the recursive relation. This helps orchestrating a set of controls, e.g. to model a so-
called “defense in-depth” approach, where multiple layers of protection are setup so potential attackers need to overcome 
various obstacles in their attempt to breach security. 
Control Evaluation and Implementation 
Like the risk determination phase the control evaluation and implementation activities revolve around quantifiable measures 
in order to select the most effective, most efficient control and reduce risk to an acceptable level. 
Our meta model in its current state cannot sufficiently support this phase as additional data is necessary, especially regarding 
effectiveness of controls. We see the potential of future research in this field in order to determine how to add measurements 
to the model in order to guide information security managers to better decisions. 
EXEMPLARY APPLICATION AND DISCUSSION 
To further elaborate on the applicability of the meta model we‟ll describe a scenario where real world data can be used to 
instantiate the model and where the model offers substantial support to managerial tasks in information security. Based on the 
discussion in the prior section we‟re using the adapted meta model to match our requirements for this scenario of threat and 
vulnerability identification. In this scenario an enterprise IT infrastructure is comprised of merely a webserver and the IS 
managers‟ task is to identify potential threats to this asset. 
For this scenario the asset, threat, vulnerability and exploit are required. While assets may have vulnerabilities, only once 
there is a way to exploit them those vulnerabilities become significant (of course vulnerabilities should be addressed evening 
without immediate threats). To test how said model could be used in a real life scenario we collected data from the 
information security mailing list “Bugtraq"1 and modeled a web server as the asset of interest. By selecting a specific version, 
in our case version 2.2.12, we got access to a list of known (and reported) vulnerabilities assigned to this version of this 
particular web server software. Additionally we added the listed exploit along with a general class of threats to the modeled 
scenario. All information is available from a generated Bugtraq report. Figure 4 shows the instantiated concepts as UML 
classes. 
                                                          
1
 http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1 
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-Vendor : String = Apache Software Foundation
-Version : String = 2.2.12
Apache Webserver <Asset>
-CVE : String = CVE-2009-3095
-Solution : String = Update
-Remote : String = Yes
-Local : String = No
-Published : Date = Sep 03 2009 12:00AM
-Updated : Date = Aug 05 2010 10:25PM
mod_proxy_ftp <Vulnerability>
-Available : String = commercially
Intervydis Exploit <Exploit>
-Type : String = Software
Input Validation Error <Threat>
u
se
s
exploits
threatens
h
as
 
Figure 4. Instantiation of Core Concepts 
As can be seen, by merely modeling his assets, the ISS manager can trace back (in this case via vulnerability reports) what 
types of threats exist and are an immediate danger and matter to be dealt with. This replaces theoretical threat models with 
actual threat models for a given asset; a webserver in our case. If this scenario was to be extended and additional complexity 
added (by adding dependencies to other assets, say a web-based content management system), further analyses can be 
performed, which would be both complex and tedious without model-support. For example side-effects of a software update 
(to mitigate the vulnerability and threat posed by the current version) may cause a conflict with business requirements, which 
rely on a web application that is only functional with the specific software version. Another possibility could be that an 
update would violate security requirements, if an ISS policy is in place that states which type of software releases are 
approved for deployment (many software products have releases for production environment and for testing environment, 
where full functionality is not guaranteed).  
Upon further inspection of various archives similar to the Bugtraq mailing list, it is our belief that this process can be easily 
automated once an ISS manager has identified and modeled the assets in his enterprise. Transforming the meta model and 
this approach into a functional tool is part of future research endeavors as page restriction limit the amount of meta model 
transformations and model instantiations that can be shown in this paper. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this paper we presented a previously constructed meta model of the ISO 27001 standard. We presented an overview of 
existing modeling approaches in the ISS domain and proposed a model driven ISS management approach to remedy certain 
conflicts and problems. A semantically evaluated meta model has been the starting point (the adapted meta model) for our 
research. 
In their comparison of security ontologies [3] focused on ontological metrics and evaluated essentially the structure of the 
proposed ontologies, not their content. Based on our comparison in [17] we could adapt the meta model for a pragmatic 
evaluation and add the necessary concepts to make the meta model applicable for a fictional scenario in the field of 
vulnerability identification, a crucial process for ISS managers. By instantiating the respective concepts of the meta model 
according to the ISRM process model by [5], an ISS manager can construct a consistent and extensive model representation 
of the key security concepts. Additionally the meta model approach allows for structured integration of multiple models in a  
multi-model-environment. 
In an extension of the presented research the relationships between the concepts will be enriched with additional data, e.g. 
empirical data regarding the effectiveness of a given control regarding a set of threats. Additionally it would be desirable to 
empirically evaluate the application of the proposed model driven ISS management approach. Also a full set of derived 
concrete models for each ISS management activity will be published. 
Milicevic et al.  Model Driven Information Security Management 
Proceedings of the Seventeenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Detroit, Michigan August 4th-7th 2011 9 
REFERENCES 
1. Amaral, F. d. N., Bazilio, C., Silva, G. M. H. d., Rademaker, A., and Haeusler, E. H. 2006. An Ontology-based 
Approach to the Formalization of Information Security Policies. In Proceedings of the 10th IEEE on International 
Enterprise Distributed Object Computing Conference Workshops EDOCW ‟06, IEEE Computer Society. 
2. Arief, B. and Besnard, D. 2003. Technical and human issues in computer-based systems security. Report No. CS-TR 
790, University of Newcastle, UK. 
3. Blanco, C., Lasheras, J., Valencia-Garcia, R., Fernandez-Medina, E., Toval, A., and Piattini, M. 2008. A Systematic 
Review and Comparison of Security Ontologies. In Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Availability, 
Reliability and Security, 813-819. 
4. Donner, M. 2003. Toward a Security Ontology, IEEE Sec. & Privacy, 1, 3, 6-7. 
5. Fenz, S. and Ekelhart, A. 2010. Verification, Validation, and Evaluation in Information Security Risk Management. 
IEEE Security & Privacy PrePrint. DOI=http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MSP.2010.117 
6. Generally Accepted Information Security Principles (GAISP) Version 3.0, 2003; www.issa.org/gaisp/_pdfs/v30.pdf. 
7. Goeken, M. and Alter, S. 2009. Towards Conceptual Metamodelling of IT Governance Frameworks. Approach - Use – 
Benefits. In Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Hawaii Int. Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii. 
8. Grubner, T. R. 1995. Towards principles for the design of ontologies used for knowledge sharing. Int. Journal of Human-
Computer Studies, 43, 5, 907-928. 
9. Gurpreet, D. and Backhouse, J. 2001. Current directions in IS security research: towards socio-organizational 
perspectives. Information Systems Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2, 127-154. 
10. International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission 2005. ISO/IEC 
27001:2005, information technology - security techniques - information security management systems- requirements. 
11. Jürjens J. 2002. UMLsec: Extending UML for Secure Systems Development. In: Lecture Notes In Computer Science 
Vol. 2460, Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on The Unified Modeling Language, Springer, S.412 – 425. 
12. Lindland, O.I., Sindre, G., and Sølvberg, A. 1994. Understanding quality in conceptual modeling. In: IEEE Software 
11(2), 42–49. 
13. Lodderstedt T., Basin, D. and Doser, J. 2002. SecureUML: A UML-Based Modeling Language for Model-Driven 
Security, Lecture Notes In Computer Science Vol. 2460, Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on The Unified 
Modeling Language, Springer Verlag (Hrsg.), S.426-441 
14. Maes, A. and Poels, G. 2007. Evaluating quality of conceptual modelling scripts based on user perceptions. Data Knowl. 
Eng. 63(3): 701-724. 
15. Mendling, J., Recker, J. 2007. Extending the Discussion of Model Quality: Why Clarity and Completeness may not 
always be enough. In: B. Pernici and J. A. Gulla: CAiSE 2007 Workshop Proceedings Vol. 1. Tapir Academic Press, 
Trondheim, Norway, pp. 109-121. 
16. Milicevic, D. and Goeken, M. 2010. Konzepte der Informationssicherheit in Informationssicherheitsstandards am 
Beispiel ISO 27001. In: Lecture Notes in Informatics (LNI) Band P-175, Springer, Leipzig. 
17. Milicevic, D. and Goeen, M. 2010. Ontology-based evaluation of ISO 27001. In: Proceedings of the 10th IFIP 
Conference on e-Business, e-Services and e-Society, Buenos Aires. 
18. Sandhu, R. S., Coyne, E. J., Feinstein, H. L., Youman, C. E. 1996. Role-based access control models. Computer 29(2), 
38-47. 
19. Schmidt, D. C. 2006. Guest Editor‟s Introduction: Model-Driven Engineering. Computer 39(2), 25-31. 
20. Sindre, G. and Opdahl, A. L. 2005. Eliciting security requirements with misuse cases, Requirements Engineering, 10, 1, 
34-44. 
21. Solms, S.H. and Solms, R. 2009. Information Security Governance, New York. 
